Washington International Law Journal
Volume 12
Number 1 Symposium: Australia's Tampa
Incident: The Convergence of International and
Domestic Refugee and Maritime Law
1-1-2003

Introduction to the Refugee Law Forum
Joan Fitzpatrick
University of Washington School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joan Fitzpatrick, Introduction, Introduction to the Refugee Law Forum, 12 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 1 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol12/iss1/3

This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright © 2003 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association

AUSTRALIA'S TAMPA INCIDENT: THE CONVERGENCE
OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC REFUGEE AND
MARITIME LAW IN THE PACIFIC RIM
INTRODUCTION TO THE REFUGEE LAW FORUM
Joan Fitzpatrickt
I.

INTRODUCTION

The ripple effects on refugee protection from the events of August and
September 2001, arising out of the rescue at sea of 433 asylum seekers by
the M/V Tampa, have been substantial. It is too early to determine whether
they will be as profound and as corrosive as the impact of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 on other intemational legal norms, including
those relating to preventive detention and to "securitizing international
migration."' Australia's actions with respect to the Tampa and subsequent
intercepted vessels, and its September 2001 legislation, 2 establish a
framework in which asylum seekers who arrive within portions of its
territory may be denied asylum, may be forcibly transported to other states
that are either not bound by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees ("Refugee Convention") or are unwilling to apply their own
refugee status determination rules, 3 and may be denied durable protection
because they arrived spontaneously rather than via resettlement.
t Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law, University of Washington. The author extends her
deepest gratitude to prominent refugee experts Mary Crock, Guy Goodwin-Gill, and Irene Khan for their
participation in the Symposium and their contributions to this issue. I would also like to express my
appreciation for the tireless work of Cannel Morgan, Emily Peyser, Jessica Tauman, and Kelly Thomas in
the planning of the symposium and the preparation of this publication, and to my colleagues Craig Allen
and Veronica Taylor for their collaboration.
Thomas Faist, 'Extension du Domaine de laLutte ": InternationalMigrationand Security Before
and After September 11, 2001, 36 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 7, 8 (2002).
2 The events and the six statutes adopted by Australia in September 2001 are detailed in Mary
Crock, In the Wake of the Tampa: Conflicting Visions of InternationalRefugee Law in the Management of
Refugee Flows, 12 PAC. RIM LAW & POL'Y. J. 49, 70 (2003).
3 Nauru, to which many asylum-seekers intercepted by Australia have
been transferred, is not a
party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJuly 28, 1951 (19 U.S.T.
6259; 189 U.N.T.S. 150; A.T.S. 1954(5)) [herinafter Refugee Convention]; United Nations Protocol to the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967 (19 U.S.T. 6223,
6224(E), 6230(F); 606 U.N.T.S. 267; A.T.S. 1973/37). The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees ("UNHCR") performs refugee status determination on Nauru. Papua New Guinea is a party to
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The Tampa incident unfolded in a vortex of policy debates concerning
secondary movements of asylum seekers, people smuggling, terrorism, and
increasingly vocal political criticism of persons seeking refugee protection in
developed states. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR") cautioned in 2002 that hysteria over irregular migration poses a
severe danger to refugee protection:
The necessary public support for the reception of asylumseekers has continued to be hampered by the tendency of
certain media and some politicians to mix illegal migration and
refugee arrivals without sufficient clarification or concern for
Sometimes, asylum-seekers were demonized,
accuracy.
especially during election campaigns. At such times, rhetoric,
antagonism and verbal or even physical attacks, against asylumseekers and refugees became particularly pronounced. UNHCR
shared the view of those NGOs and other community leaders
who responded with measures designed to show that asylumseekers and refugees should not be made scapegoats for failed
economic policies and that racism and xenophobia should not
4
find a place in election campaigns.
Human Rights Watch cautions that Australia's "Pacific Solution" is

"not for export" 5 and that it cannot grant asylum "by invitation only."6 Yet,

during 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees proposed
a "Convention Plus" approach to discourage secondary movements by7
asylum seekers and to facilitate collective management of refugee flows.
While many observers believed that Australia's deflection of refugee
processing to its Pacific Island neighbors would prove unsustainable, an

the Refugee Convention, but has ceded refugee status determination to Australian officials with regard to
the asylum seekers intercepted by Australia and removed to Manus Island in Papua New Guinea. UNHCR
does not participate in these proceedings. Id.
' Note on InternationalProtection, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [hereinafter UNHCR],
para. 45, U.N. Doc. AIAC.96/965 (2002).
5 Human Rights Watch, Notfor Export: Why the InternationalCommunity Should Reject
Australia'sRefugee Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, Sept. 2002,
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/09/auslorfD926.htm.
6 By Invitation Only: Australian Asylum Policy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Vol. 14, No. 10(C), Dec.
2002.
7 Mr. Ruud Lubbers, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statement at an informal
meeting of the European Union Justice and Home Affairs Council (Sept. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/print?tbl=ADMIN&id=3d92deeb6 (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
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infusion of new economic aid to Nauru extended the problematic partnership
between the two states beyond 2002.8
II.

THE REFUGEE ARTICLES: A CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

During April 2002, the University of Washington School of Law was
privileged to host three outstanding experts on refugee law who offered
important and insightful reflections on the Tampa affair-Mary Crock, Guy
Goodwin-Gill, and Irene Khan. Their contributions to the Symposium are
presented in this volume of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal. I am
honored to introduce their articles, and to provide additional reflections on
the state of refugee protection in the aftermath of the traumatic events of
August and September 2001.
A.

Local Settlement

The three durable solutions to the forced migration of refugees are
local settlement, repatriation, and resettlement.
During the decades
following the adoption of the Refugee Convention, local settlement-the
grant of asylum or equivalent permission to remain in lawful residence in a
state of refuge-was the most common solution. The causes of forced
migration were generally regarded as enduring, and the appropriateness of
policies favoring integration of refugees was widely accepted. Especially
for traditional states of immigration, such as the United States and Australia,
the granting of durable asylum to the largely European refugees displaced by
the Second World War was uncontroversial and constituted an integral
element of these states' foreign and economic policies during the Cold War.
The Refugee Convention mandates the extension of economic and social
rights to recognized refugees, with entitlements increasing with duration of
residence. Article 34 of the Refugee Convention encourages asylum states
to naturalize refugees, thereby sealing a durable legal, social, and political
attachment to them. The emphasis upon local settlement did not escape
criticism, however, and some commentators questioned the "exilic bias" of
state practice during the
first three or four decades following adoption of the
9
Refugee Convention.
8 Australia to Continue Sending Asylum-Seekers to Island Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002,
LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (agreeing to maintain detention centers for asylum seekers in exchange
for an additional $8.2 million in foreign aid).
' Gervase Coles, Approaching the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 373 (Gil Loescher & Leila Monahan eds., 1989).
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Repatriation

In more recent years, repatriation came to be seen as the optimal
durable solution for refugees. ° The restoration of democracy in various
states, along with the end of the Cold War, aroused optimism that forced
migrants could return in safety and dignity to their states of origin, being
spared life-long exile and enjoying an opportunity to participate in the
rebuilding of their societies. Large-scale repatriations have sometimes been
successfully engineered, generally on a voluntary basis. 1 The massive
returns of Afghans since the fall of the Taliban regime present a problematic
example of this type of "solution," as the durability of the change in
resources for successful
conditions remains questionable, and as
12
reintegration of returnees remain inadequate.
Faith that contemporary refugee crises would prove to be short-lived
also generated enthusiasm for temporary protection. Temporary protection
came to be regarded not only as a means to extend protection to persons
fleeing serious but non-persecutory harm, such as war victims, but also as a
substitute protection for Convention refugees or mixed flows during periods
of mass influx. 13 One profound irony of the legislation adopted in Australia
over the last several years is that temporary protection (in the form of
"temporary protection visas") has become a device to punish spontaneously
arriving asylum seekers, who are Convention refugees, by depriving them of
their continued need for
durable asylum, requiring them to repeatedly prove
14
protection, and denying them family reunification.
Temporary protection also had a link to earlier refugee crises in which
resettlement played an important protection role. During the mass influxes
10 Agenda for Protection, Report of the Fifty-third Session of the High Commissioner's Programme,
UNHCR, Annex IV, at 57, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/973 (2002) [hereinafter Agenda for Protection].
" MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1997). The
cessation clauses have been little used to terminate refugee protection and are only beginning to be fully
explicated. Involuntary repatriation of formerly recognized refugees remains rare.
12 Note on InternationalProtection, supra note 4, paras. 62-64.
13 Temporary Protected Status ("TPS") in the United States is an example of protection for a
widened category of persons facing danger or hardship if returned to their states of origin. 8 U.S.C. §1254a
(2000). TPS does not function as an admissions program. 8 U.S.C. §1254a(c)(5)(2000). Temporary
protection as established in the European Union is limited to mass influx situations, and can be extended to
Convention refugees as well as persons fleeing more generalized dangers. Directive 2001/55/EC on
minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and
on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing
the consequences thereof, Council Directive 2001/55/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 212/12).
14 By Invitation Only, supra note 6, at 81-89; Penelope Mathew, Australian Refugee Protection in the
Wake of the Tampa, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 661, 672-676 (2002).
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from Southeast Asian states in the 1970s and 1980s, frontline states that
were not parties to the Refugee Convention were induced to grant temporary
refuge to asylum seekers. The quid pro quo was a promise that more distant
states, including Australia, Sweden, and the United States, would resettle
and grant durable refugee status to a significant segment of those granted
temporary refuge. Resettlement, along with more frequent repatriation of
those ineligible for refugee protection, composed elements of the
Comprehensive Plan of Action to resolve the lingering Southeast Asian
refugee crisis-an example of multilateral cooperative management of
refugee flows.
C.

Resettlement

Resettlement remained an important element of the refugee policies of
approximately ten states.15 During the "dirty wars" in South America, for
example, refugees were successfully resettled out of the region in modest
numbers.' 6 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees varied in
the degree of emphasis it placed on its resettlement program, and the number
of states that formally participate in resettlement of refugees referred by
UNHCR remains strikingly small-only eighteen by current count.' 7 One
major receiving state, the United States, experienced a sharp decline in
resettlement during fiscal year 2002, because of the imposition of
demanding new security screening in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001."8
Il1.

AUSTRALIA'S REFUGEE POLICY

Australia's policy of granting durable refugee status only to persons
who are pre-selected for resettlement constitutes a significant
reinterpretation of the process and dynamic of refugee protection. Other
states, that are traditional immigration states and that have admitted large
numbers of refugees directly from states of first asylum or from states of
15Gary Troeller, UNHCR Resettlement: Evolution and FutureDirection, 14 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 85,
88 (2002). These states are the United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia. Id. at 88, n.7.
16 Troeller estimates that 15,000 Latin Americans were resettled beginning in the
1970s. Id. at 87.
17 Recently, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile,
Iceland, Ireland, and Spain have offered
to assist UNHCR with resettlement. Id. at 93.
18 Although 70,000 overseas refugee admissions had been authorized for FY 2002, only
27,075
refugees were actually admitted to the United States during that period. Bush Administration to Reduce
Refugee Admissions in FY2003, 23 REFUGEE REP. 1, 1 (Sept./Oct. 2002).
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origin, continue to offer durable refugee protection, in the form of indefinite
grants of asylum with derivative family benefits (potentially leading to

lawful permanent residence) and non-refoulement, to arriving asylum
seekers. The United States is an example of a state that operates both an
overseas refugee admissions program and a system for granting asylum to
spontaneously arriving asylum seekers and persons already present in its
territory. European Union states have only recently begun to explore the
possibility of eneaging directly in refugee status determination outside their
own boundaries.
At the same time, the phenomena of migrant smuggling and mass boat
arrivals have generated draconian reactions in a number of receiving states.
The interdiction of the Tampa and subsequent vessels by the Australian
military seemed to replicate interdiction policies adopted by the United
States, especially with regard to Haitian asylum seekers. Yet, the contrasts
between the two interdiction programs are perhaps more interesting than
their similarities.
A.

Australian and American Policies

While the Haitian interdiction program evolved over time, the
harshest phase involved the direct return of Haitian asylum seekers to Haiti
without any screening to determine whether they met the refugee definition.
This policy was notoriously upheld as consistent both with the 1967 Refugee
Protocol and with United States law by the Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc. 2° Despite its many drawbacks, Australia's "Pacific
Solution" has not yet resulted in the involuntary refoulement of refugees
without any semblance of screening for refugee status. 21 However, the
combination of denial of family reunification to holders of temporary
protection visas; harsh detention conditions in Nauru, Papua New Guinea,
and Christmas Island; the interdiction of family members; and family
members' return to an insecure status in states such as Indonesia, may result
in "voluntary" repatriation of refugees who are unable to withstand these
stresses.
19 Gregor Noll & Jessica Fagerlund, Safe Avenues to Asylum? The Actual and Potential Role of EU
Diplomatic Representations in Processing Asylum Requests (Danish Centre for Human Rights/UNHCR,
April 2002).
2o Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
21 Australia and Afghanistan negotiated an agreement providing reintegration assistance for persons
agreeing to be repatriated from detention in Australia and Nauru. By Invitation Only, supra note 6, at 75.
By October 8, 2002, 410 detainees on Nauru (398 Afghans, six Iranians, three Sri Lankans, and three
Iraqis) had accepted the reintegration package. Id.
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The notion that states are free to redefine the geographic scope of their
international legal obligations under the Refugee Convention seems to be
shared by the United States and Australian Governments. The United States
never denied that Haitian asylum seekers who arrived within its territorial
waters had a right to apply for asylum, although recently, persons arriving
irregularly by boat have been subjected to expedited removal, which
provides a truncated and unreliable process for screening persons for a
credible fear of persecution. 22 Australia has gone further than the United
States in attempting to excise portions of territory over which it exercises
undisputed sovereignty from its "migration zone., 23 Christmas Island is thus
transformed into a variant on Guantanamo. 24 As Guy Goodwin-Gill notes,
sovereignty carries with it obligations as well as power, costs as well as
benefits.25
B.

Current Trends

The association of migration with security threats and organized crime
by politicians and the general public contributed to the Tampa crisis.
Strangely, victims fleeing regimes involved with international terrorism (the
Taliban in Afghanistan) or accused of possessing weapons of mass
destruction (Saddam Hussein in Iraq) became confused with their own
persecutors. These Afghan and Iraqi asylum seekers, arriving with the
assistance of smugglers, became the objects of fear and distrust, rather than
the beneficiaries of ideological solidarity, as the anti-Communist refugees
traditionally welcomed in the West had been. Despite the demonization of
the Taliban and the insistence by policy makers in the antiterrorist coalition
that the Afghan war remains an international armed conflict, the premature
cessation of refugee protection for Afghans has become a troubling
possibility.
The High Commissioner's "Convention Plus" proposal builds upon
the desire of policy makers for more comprehensive management of
22 Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the
Immiration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 219 (Nov. 13, 2002).
Australia has purported to"excise" Christmas Island from its
migration zone, to establish a
refugee processing/detention center there, and to screen asylum seekers without providing the opportunity
to apply for permanent protection visas. Human Rights Watch, supra note 5, at 4-6.
24 Harold Koh described the Guantinamo Naval Base as a "rights-free
zone" during the period when
Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers were being detained there and denied access to counsel and U.S. courts
to assert their rights under international and U.S. law. Harold Hongju Koh, America 's Offshore Refugee
Camps, 29 RICH. L. REv. 139, 140-41 (1994).
25 Guy Goodwin-Gill, Refugees and Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century: More
Lessons from
the South Pacific, 12 PAC. RIM LAW & POL'Y J.23, 25 (2003).
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international migration. As High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers stated to the
of the Executive Committee of the High Commi;ssioner's
Fifty-third Session
26
Programme:
The "Plus" concerns special agreements for improving burden
sharing, with countries in the North and South working together
It concerns
to find durable solutions for refugees.
outflows. It
of
massive
in
cases
of
action
plans
comprehensive
the
defining
movements,'
'secondary
on
agreements
concerns
and
transit,
of
origin,
of
countries
responsibilities
and
roles
It concerns better targeting of
potential destination.
regions of origin, helping refugee
in
development assistance
hosting countries to facilitate local integration, and enhancing
And it concerns multilateral
post-conflict reintegration.
commitments for resettlement.
The Agenda for Protection recently approved by the Executive Committee
contains a number of points relating to resettlement, as a "protection tool"
(for example, to relocate women at risk in a state 27of first asylum), as a
"durable solution," and as a "tool of burden sharing."
Despite shared concerns over the dangers posed by the irregular
arrival of asylum seekers, often via maritime smuggling routes, no state has
yet attempted to replicate the "Pacific Solution" or to deny durable asylum
as a penalty for jumping a hypothetical resettlement queue. We must await
the international response to the "Convention Plus" initiative, in order to
determine if the Tampa incident signals a dramatic departure from the
decentralized system of protection traditionally exercised under the Refugee
Convention and Protocol, to a system of much more intense collaboration
and collective management by states. Such a system may privilege the
security, political, and economic concerns of receiving states over the
autonomy, dignity, and family rights of refugees.

26 Report of the Fifty-third Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's
Programme, UNHCR, Annex II, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/973(2002) (opening statement by Mr. Rudd
Lubbers).
27 Agendafor Protection, supra note 10, Annex IV, at 54, 59.

